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UP THE DOWN-SLIDING SCALE: BORAAS V. VILLAGE
OF BELLE TERRE AND EQUAL PROTECTION ASSAULT
ON RESTRICTIVE DEFINITIONS OF "FAMILY" IN
ZONING ORDINANCES
I. Introduction
The Village of Belle Terre, a community of 700 residents occupying ap-
proximately 220 homes in Suffolk County, New York, is zoned exclusively for
one-family dwellings.1 A village ordinance defines "family" as:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit. .. [A] number of persons
but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single house-
keeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be
deemed to constitute a family.2
As a sanction, the ordinance further provides that each violation entails a $100
fine or 60-day imprisonment, or both. Moreover, a separate and distinct offense
takes place on each day during or on which a violation occurs.'
On December 31, 1971, plaintiffs Edwin and Judith Dickman, owners of a
house in Belle Terre, leased the premises to six unrelated students at the State
University of New York at Stony Brook, including plaintiffs Bruce Boraas, Anne
Parish, and Michael Truman. On July 31, 1972, the Dickmans received an
"Order to Remedy Violations" from the village warning them of possible liability
under the zoning ordinance commencing August 3, 1972.
Plaintiffs commenced an action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York on August 2, 1972, under the federal Civil Rights
Act of 187 1' against the mayor and trustees of Belle Terre seeking injunctive
relief against enforcement of the ordinance and a declaratory judgment invalidat-
ing as unconstitutional the prohibition against residential occupancy by more
than two unrelated persons. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that the ordinance
denied them equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment,
violated their right of association under the first and fourteenth amendments,5
intruded on their right to privacy,' and contravened their right to travel.7 The
district court denied injunctive relief and upheld the validity of the ordinance.8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
I BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE OF THE VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE, art. I, § D-1.34a (1971)
defines one-family dwelling as:
A detached house consisting of or intended to be occupied as a residence by one
family only, as family is hereafter defined. In no case shall a lodging house, board-
ing house, fraternity house, sorority house or multiple dwelling be classified or con-
strued as a one family dwelling.
2 Id. art. I, § D-1.35a (1970).
3 Id. art. VIII, Part 4, § M-1.4a(2) (1971).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
5 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
6 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. juris. noted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 73-191).
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reversed, holding the ordinance unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection
of the law. In the court's opinion, the legislative classification permitting tradi-
tional families of more than two members to occupy one-family dwellings while
prohibiting groups of more than two unrelated individuals from doing so could
not be sustained on the basis of the local community's interest in the protection
and maintenance of the traditional family pattern. Further, the court refused to
sustain the ordinance on the grounds that it did not have a rational basis in
traditionally recognized zoning objectives."°
In reaching its conclusion the court refrained from characterizing the rights
asserted by plaintiffs as "fundamental," thereby avoiding a "strict scrutiny-
compelling state interest" equal protection analysis.'1 Nor did the court utilize a
"minimal scrutiny" approach which would uphold the ordinance if any con-
ceivable rational basis for it could be ascertained." The court of appeals instead
concluded that the important nature of the rights asserted by the plaintiffs war-
ranted an intermediate approach, one which allows "consideration to be given
to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of
the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of
it.""3 Under such an analysis, "the test for application of the Equal Protection
Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the
object of the statute."' 4
Using this "sliding-scale" or "means-evaluation" test, the court first de-
termined that the goal of preservation of the traditional family pattern "fails to
fall within the proper exercise of state police power."' 5 More importantly, the
court scrutinized the relationship of the "family" ordinance to the admittedly
legitimate goals of controlling population density, avoiding rent inflation, and
curbing parking, traffic, and noise problems. None of these goals could validate
the ordinance since the objectives "could be achieved more rationally and with-
out discrimination against unrelated groups" through the use of alternative
means.
16
This note will first briefly examine the Supreme Court's development of
equal protection doctrine, focusing on the "sliding-scale" or "means-evaluation"
test. A short survey of the history of restrictive definitions of "family" in the
courts will follow. The Boraas case itself will then be analyzed in detail, and
finally the alternatives open to the Supreme Court on appeal will be considered.
II. Equal Protection: Old, New, and Newer Still
A. Old: Minimal Scrutiny
Traditionally the demands of equal protection have given the legislature
wide latitude in establishing classifications; the Supreme Court has carefully
9 Id. at 808.
10 Id. at 815-17.
11 Id. at 813-814.
12 Id. at 814.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 815.
16 Id. at 816-17.
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restricted its inquiry when faced with claims of denial of' equal protection.'7
In one classic formulation: "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial re-
lation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike."18 Chief Justice Warren formulated an even more per-
missive criterion to govern such "minimal scrutiny" analysis in McGowan v.
Maryland:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective ....
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it.' 9
The essence of "minimal scrutiny" thus consists of a hypothetical, and not factual,
inquiry into the rational basis for a given classification.
B. New: Strict Scrutiny
Recent judicial dissatisfaction with the limitations of the "old" equal pro-
tection led to a search for an analytical method allowing closer judicial examina-
tion of allegedly discriminatory classifications. When the classification has been
along the lines of "suspect criteria" or when it has infringed upon a "funda-
mental right," the Court has invoked a "strict scrutiny" approach under which
the classification must be "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.""0
Race has always been considered a "suspect criterion" under the equal
protection clause; indeed, for many years it was the only such criterion.2" More
recently the Court has added alienage22 and nationality" to the "suspect" cate-
gory. Arguably the list also includes sex24 and wealth. 5
The list of "fundamental" rights has also expanded slowly. They presently
include the right to marriage and procreation,2" the right to privacy," the right
17 G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLINO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 989 (8th ed. 1970).
18 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
19 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911).
20 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
21 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
22 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971): "[T]he Court's decisions have
established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. -, 93
S. Ct. 2842 (1973).
23 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
24 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court invalidated the statute on pur-
portedly "minimal scrutiny" grounds, but one may argue that in reality a stricter test was
utilized; for a fuller discussion of this case, see note 35 infra. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973), four of the Justices concluded that sex classifications were inherently
suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
25 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) has made
substantial inroads on the viability of wealth as a suspect classification. Speaking for the
majority, Mr. Justice Powell noted that "[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth
discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny." Id. at 29.
26 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
27 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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to essential facilities for the prosecution of a criminal appeal,28 the right to vote,29
and the right to travel."0
This "two-tiered" equal protection scheme thus resolves itself into a question
of constitutional presumptions. "Minimal scrutiny" analysis in effect clothes
the classification with a strong presumption of constitutional validity. "Strict
scrutiny," though nowhere expressly so stated, apparently subjects the classifica-
tion to an equally strong presumption of unconstitutionality.
C. Newer Still: Means-Evaluation
During the 1971-1972 and 1972-1973 terms, the Supreme Court voiced
some dissatisfaction with the rigidities of the "two-tier" approach, evincing a
desire for a more flexible and equitable model for equal protection analysis. One
commentator offered the components of such an inquiry as early as 1965:
1) What are the character and importance of the interests which the state is
attempting to protect or promote by the rule in question?
2) What are the character and importance of the interests adversely affected
by the rule in question?
3) How substantial is the connection between the particular basis of classifi-
cation represented by the rule in question and the legitimate purpose(s) it is
designed to serve?
4) Are there available to the state alternative means of serving those pur-
poses adequately, without so adversely affecting the significant interests of
those who are placed at a disadvantage by the rule in question?3 1
Under such an analysis, as the importance of the allegedly infringed right in-
creases, the state must demonstrate a correspondingly more important govern-
mental interest to justify its classification. Moreover, hypothetically rational
bases will not suffice; the state must demonstrate a rational and factual relation-
ship between the classification and the interests it seeks to promote.
An early appearance of this "means-evaluation" model occurred in Dunn
v. Blumsteinr3 2 in which the Supreme Court invalidated Tennessee's durational
residency requirement for voters. Although ostensibly applying a "strict scrutiny"
test, the Court appeared to place more stress on "sliding-scale" than "compelling
state interest" criteria." As to the latter, the Court noted:
28 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
29 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
30 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
31 Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Uni.
versities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRArsrTIoN Q. 28-29 (1965).
32 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
33 Id. at 335:
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in essence,
to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual
interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in
support of the classification.
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Thus phrased, the constitutional question may sound like a mathematical
formula. But legal "tests" do not have the precision of mathematical
formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden
of justification is on the State, and that the statute will be closely scrutinized
in light of its asserted purposes."
A marked tendency to move beyond the confines of "two-tier" equal protection
in the manner hinted by Dunn emerges from a consideration of decisions during
the 1971 and 1972 terms. The Supreme Court has applied some type of "sliding-
scale" or "means-evaluation" test in cases involving sex discrimination,"5 dis-
tribution of contraceptives, " pretrial commitment of the mentally incompetent,3 7
the rights of illegitimates," recoupment of legal defense fees expended on behalf
34 Id. at 342-43.
35 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court invalidated a provision of the Idaho pro-
bate code giving preference to men over women when persons of the same priority applied for
appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. In the course of his opinion for a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger observed:
Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one
class of contests is not without some legitimacy. The crucial question, however, is
whether § 15-314 advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command
of the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that it does not. . . . [WIhatever may be
said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this
context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex. Id. at 76-77.
36 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court struck down a ban on the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, noting:
The question for our determination in this case is whether there is some ground of
difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and un-
married persons under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, §§ 21 and 21A.
Id. at 447.
Th'e very terms of the State's criminal statutes, coupled with the de minimis effect of
§§ 21 and 21A in deterring fornication, thus compel the conclusion that such de-
terrence cannot reasonably be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Id. at 450.
[lealth, on the face of the statute, may no more reasonably be regarded as its pur-
pose than the deterrence of premarital sexual relations. Id. at 452.
37 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In holding the State's provisions for pre-
trial commitment of mentally incompetent criminal defendants violative of equal protection,
the Court observed:
The harm to the individual is just as great if the State, without reasonable
justification, can apply standards making his commitment a permanent one when
standards generally applicable to all others afford him a substantial opportunity
for early release.
As we noted above, we cannot conclude that pending criminal charges provide
a greater justification for different treatment than conviction and sentence. Id. at
729-30.
See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 '(1972).
38 Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). This case invalidated a
provision of Louisiana's workmen's compensation laws disadvantaging illegitimates. In the
course of his opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Powell observed:
Though the latitude given state economic and social regulations is necessarily broad,
when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal
rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny. . . . The essential inquiry in all the
foregoing cases is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest
does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classifi-
cation endanger? Id. at 172-73.
mhe regulation and protection of the family unit have indeed been a venerable state
concern. We do not question the importance of that interest; what we do question
is how the challenged statute will promote it. Id. at 173.
[December 1973]
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of indigents, 9 picketing,"0 residency requirements for state college tuition pur-
poses, 4 1 and sections of the Food Stamp Act of 1964.42
Clarity characterizes none of these decisions; to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Holmes, the Court appears animated by an imagination fired with a desire to
obfuscate. The ad hoc quality of these opinions leaves unresolved which situa-
tions properly invoke "sliding-scale" analysis, as well as how that test should be
applied. To compound this confusion, other recent Supreme Court decisions
indicate a continued adherence to the "two-tier" approach. 3 Boraas v. Village
of Belle Terre affords the Court an excellent opportunity to resolve these difficult
problems. To adequately examine that case and the possibilities it offers on
appeal, a brief survey of judicial attitudes toward restrictive definitions of
"family" in zoning ordinances is necessary.
The inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bears, in this
instance, no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of recovery which
workmen's compensation statutes commendably serve. Id. at 175.
[Tihe Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws
relating to status of birth where-as in this case-the classification is justified by no
legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise. Id. at 176.
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
39 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972):
We thus recognize that state recoupment statutes may betoken legitimate state
interests. But these interests are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment
of indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors to whom the statute itself
repeatedly makes reference. State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state interests
they may serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of in-
digents for self-sufficiency and self-respect. The statute before us embodies elements
of punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal treat-
ment under the law. Id. at 141-42.
40 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The Court here invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school unless that school was involved in a labor
dispute, noting:
As in all equal protection cases, however, the crucial question is whether there is an
appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.
Id. at 95.
Predictions about imminent disruption from picketing involve judgments appropriately
made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications, especially
those based on subject matter. Id. at 100-101.
41 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2230 (1973).
42 United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973).
The Court struck down an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 excluding from par-
ticipation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual unrelated to any
other member of the household. Mr. Justice Brennan spoke for the majority:
The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment was
intended to prevent so-called "hippies" and "hippie communes" from participating
in the food stamp program. . . . The challenged classification clearly cannot be
sustained by reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional con-
ception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate government interest. Id. at 2826.
Moreover, in practical effect, the challenged classification simply does not operate
so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud. Id. at 2827.
43 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 '(1973) (upholding
Texas system of public education financing); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dis., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (allowing the district to vermit only landowners to vote
and to apportion votes according to the assessed value of the land) ; Hurtado v. United States,
410 U.S. 578 (1973) (involving compensation to an incarcerated material witness); Lehn-
hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (validating Illinois' imposition of
personal property taxes on corporations but not on individuals); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263 (1973) (upholding denial of "good time" credit for presentence incarceration in county
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III. Zoning and the Traditional Family: The Position of the Courts until Boraas
A. State
In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner," the Illinois Supreme Court considered
the validity of a zoning ordinance defining "family" as:
one or more persons each related to the other by blood (or adoption or
marriage), together with such relatives' respective spouses, who are living
together in a single dwelling and maintaining a common household. A
"family" includes any domestic servants and not more than one gratuitous
guest residing with said "family." 45
In the course of his opinion, Justice Schaefer considered the relationship of the
ordinance to stabilizing neighborhoods, limiting intensity of land use, and
curbing traffic and parking problems:
[None of these observations reflects a universal truth. Family groups are
mobile today, and not all family units are internally stable and well-dis-
ciplined. Family groups with two or more cars are not unfamiliar. And so
far as intensity of use is concerned, the definition in the present ordinance,
with its reference to the "respective spouses" of persons related by blood,
marriage or adoption, can hardly be regarded as an effective control upon
the size of family units.
46
The court, however, resolved the issue by declaring the ordinance ultra vires the
state's enabling legislation, thus failing to reach the constitutional questions posed
by the case.4
On three occasions New Jersey courts have considered restrictive zoning
definitions of "family." In City of Newark v. Johnson,4" the court upheld such
an ordinance as not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory contending that
"the family status, as defined and restricted by said ordinance, does have a
bearing toward preventing overcrowding of a one-family building." '49
jails); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding Texas scheme providing lower
welfare benefits for AFDC recipients) ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (refusal to hold
housing a "fundamental right"); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (upholding a
provision of the 1963 Illinois bail reform law); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971)
'(sustaining a reduction in Social Security disability benefits to reflect workmen's compensation
receipts).
The language of even these decisions, however, suggests uneasiness with the "minimal
scrutiny" standards of McGowan. In McGinnis, the Court took pains to note it had "supplied
no imaginary basis or purpose for this statutory scheme." 410 U.S. at 277. In Rodriguez, the
Court stated the proper inquiry to be "whether [the scheme] rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose." 411 U.S. at 17.
44 34 Ill.2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
45 Id. at 433-34, 216 N.E.2d at 117.
46 Id. at 437-38, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
47 Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 120.
48 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (Essex County Ct., L. Div., Grim. 1961). The
ordinance defined "family" as "one or more persons who live together in one dwelling unit
and maintain a common household and who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption."
Id. at 384, 175 A.2d at 501.
49 Id. at 387, 175 A.2d at 503.
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In Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City,5" a New Jersey lower
court invalidated a similar "family" ordinance designed to prevent summer rental
of houses to unrelated groups of young men and women in order to prevent
noise and disturbance. The plaintiff-owners contended that the ordinance
worked a deprivation of substantive due process, and the court agreed:
[E]ven in the light of the legitimate concern of the municipality with the
undesirable concomitants of group rentals experienced in Margate City,
and of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinances, we are satisfied
that the remedy here adopted constitutes a sweepingly excessive restriction
of property rights as against the problem sought to be dealt with, and in
legal contemplation deprives plaintiffs of their property without due
process.5'
The highest New Jersey court finally spoke to the issue in Kirsch Holding
Co. v. Borough of Manasquan.2 As in Gabe Collins, the ordinances in question
were designed to prohibit group rentals of seasonal seashore resorts to unrelated
individuals. The New Jersey Supreme Court held the ordinances "so sweepingly
excessive, and therefore legally unreasonable, that they must fall in their en-
tirety.""3 The court pointed out that under the ordinance, "two unrelated fami-
lies of spouses and children cannot share an adequate cottage or house for the
summer, nor could a small unrelated group of widows, widowers, older spinsters
or bachelors - or even of judges.""
Believing that effective enforcement of general police power regulations and
criminal statutes could suffice to curb any obnoxious behavior inherent in group
rentals, the court noted: "Zoning ordinances are not intended and cannot be
expected to cure or prevent most anti-social conduct in dwelling situations."55
B. Federal
Prior to Boraas, only one federal court had considered the constitutional
implications of a restrictive zoning definition of "family." In Palo Alto Tenants
Union v. Morgan,"' a federal district court in California sustained the validity of
the city's definition of "family"5 against a constitutional challenge by members
of a commune. Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance constituted an infringement
on their freedom of association and right to privacy and also contended that it
50 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970). The ordinance in question
defined "family" as "one or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or not more
than two unrelated persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single non-profit housekeeping
unit." Id. at 342, 271 A.2d at 430.
51 Id. at 349, 271 A.2d at 434.
52 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
53 Id. at 252, 281 A.2d at 518.
54 Id. at 248, %81 A.2d at 517.
55 Id. at 253-54. 281 A.2d at 520.
56 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970). For criticism of this case, see Comment, The
Constitutional Implications of a Restrictive Definition of Family in Zoning Ordinances, 17
S.D. L. REv. 203 (1972). A less antipathetic view appears in Comment, Zoning, Communes
and Equal Protection, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 319.
57 Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Palo Alto's
ordinance defined "family" as "one person living alone, or two or more persons related by
blood, marriage, or legal adoption, or a group not exceeding four persons living as a single
housekeeping unit." Id. at 909.
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violated more general rights to equal protection and due process of law. 8
Operating within the "two-tier" equal protection doctrine, the court first
determined that the ordinance did not intrude upon a constitutionally protected
fundamental right. With regard to freedom of association, the court held: "The
right to form such groups may be constitutionally protected, but the right to
insist that these groups live under the same roof, in any part of the city they
choose, is not."59
Further, the court found no violation of the right to privacy since the ordi-
nance did not entail any of the " 'repulsive' investigative tactics" that so distressed
the Supreme Court in Griswold.6"
Turning therefore to "minimal scrutiny" analysis, the court found that the
ordinance had a rational basis in the light of three legitimate zoning objectives:
(1) limiting population density, (2) alleviating noise and traffic problems, and
(3) maintaining the rent structure df a neighborhood, which might undergo
inflation upon an influx of unrelated persons with separate sources of income.61
In the course of its opinion the court emphasized "the State's clear interest in
preserving the integrity of the biological and/or legal family,"62 suggesting that
preservation and maintenance of the traditional family pattern could in itself
constitute a legitimate zoning objective.
IV. Analysis of Boraas
The initial question in Boraas was, of course, the applicability vel non of
the "means-evaluation" test to zoning ordinances. If such analysis was found
to apply, two further questions remained. Could the ordinance survive such
"means-evaluation" as an attempt to preserve and maintain the traditional
family? If not, could it nonetheless be upheld on the basis of its relationship to
other zoning objectives such as controlling population density, eliminating traffic,
noise, and parking problems, and curbing rent inflation?
A. Applicability of the "Sliding-Scale"
Based on the recent Supreme Court decisions discussed aboves (which, as
has been seen, present anything but an unambiguous mandate), the majority
in Boraas formulated the test for "means-evaluation" as "whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute."'" Left
unclear were the reasons why the court thought such an approach appropriate
to zoning ordinances defining "family." Apparently the "important"6 nature
of the plaintiff's rights weighed heavily in the decision to invoke the "sliding-
scale," as well as the type of discrimination involved, since the court noted that
the "means-evaluation" test "is particularly appropriate in cases of the present
58 Id. at 910.
59 Id. at 911-12.
60 Id. at 912.
61 Id. at 912-13.
62 Id. at 912.
63 See text accompanying notes 32-42 supra.
64 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973).
65 Id. at 813.
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type, where individual human rights of groups as opposed to business regulations
are involved.""8
In dissent, Judge Timbers contended that a court should not apply such a
test to "traditional 'hands-off' areas of legislative activity" such as zoning."
Although Judge Timbers did not develop his position in detail, the argument
in support of it is a strong one.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.8 the Supreme Court in 1926
gave wide latitude to local legislatures in enacting zoning ordinances, approving
their constitutionality unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 9
The Court did note that it would invalidate an ordinance if in concrete appli-
cation to particular premises, it proved arbitrary or unreasonable." In fact,
two years later, in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,"1 the Court struck down a zon-
ing ordinance under just such a test. The possibility that the Court would closely
police zoning regulations soon faded; since 1928 the Supreme Court has not
reviewed a zoning case, allowing determinations of the constitutional principle
of reasonableness to devolve upon the states.7 2 This 45-year silence of the Su-
preme Court on the issue should have led the Boraas court to exercise a less vigor-
ous scrutiny of the ordinance.
Moreover, among the state courts themselves zoning ordinances have tradi-
tionally enjoyed an extremely strong presumption of constitutional validity:7
Notwithstanding the differences in language used to describe the kind and
degree of proof needed to upset a zoning ordinance, it seems clear that in
nearly all of the states the burden of proof can properly be described as an
"extraordinary" one.74
Court decisions on zoning display "an expanding judicial concept of the
public welfare and a consequent enlargement of the police power."' 5 The
decision in Boraas, then, represents an abrupt departure from this laissez-faire
judicial attitude.
Furthermore, the dangers inherent in stricter judicial review of zoning
ordinances suggest that the degree of scrutiny applied by the Boraas court was
inordinate. Although there has been an increased call for heightened intervention
in zoning cases, 6 new judicial techniques for attacking zoning ordinances come
66 Id. at 815.
67 Id. at 822.
68 272 U.S. 365 '(1926).
69 Id. at 395.
70 Id.
71 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
72 A. CASNER AND W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1207 (2d ed. 1969).
73 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14 at 67 *(1968). A host of cases
supports this presumptive validity. Id. at n.20.
74 Id. § 2.15 at 72.
75 Id. § 7.03 at 483.
76 Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. Rnv. 767 (1969); Note. The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J.896 (1970); Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws,
66 Nw. U. L. REv. 635 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MIe. L.
REv. 339 '(1970); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra
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dangerously close to the discredited theory of substantive due process." Such
intense scrutiny emasculates conventional planning techniques since any com-
munity plan would become subject to a plethora of constitutional attacks.""
Further, such an approach ignores the "majority will which is supposedly
represented in legislative and administrative determinations implementing zoning
ordinances." 9 Applying "strict scrutiny" to zoning entails other hazardous
consequences:
Were a court to find the Shapiro doctrine applicable in such a case, and
hold that an inferred right of any group to live wherever it chooses might
not be abridged without some compelling state interest, the law of zoning
could be literally turned upside down: presumptions of validity would be-
come presumptions of invalidity and traditional police powers of a state
would be severely circumscribed by new and vague notions of substantive
equal protection.80
These considerations demonstrate that the Boraas decision represents an
abrupt, not to say radical, break with the prevailing attitude towards zoning
ordinances of the last 45 years. It is clear, therefore, that the applicability of
"sliding-scale" analysis in this area must rest on a more adequately developed
doctrinal basis than the adumbrated rationale offered by the court of appeals."'
B. The Test as Applied
1. Zoning for the traditional family
Assuming "means-evaluation" to be applicable in a Boraas-type situ-
ation, the question remains as to how such an analysis should be conducted. The
majority in Boraas first considered the statute as a means of furthering the state's
interest in preserving and maintaining the traditional family pattern.
The state's "legally protectable affirmative interest" in the traditional family
provided the sole grounds on which the district court upheld the ordinance.8 2
That court stated that the interest of such families in maintaining uses of the
same character in their community was a "proper zoning consideration."'
Judge Dooling then characterized the ordinance as
simply another of the countless statutes of bounty and protection with
which the states, and all of them, and the Federal government alike aggres-
sively surround the traditional family of parents and their children, reaching
from family court laws, through laws of inheritance to tax laws.8
and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971). Most of the discussion has centered on the econom-
ically discriminatory effect of exclusionary zoning.
77 Ruttger, Judicial Remedial Action in Zoning Cases: An Emerging Standard for Re-
view, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 191.
78 Id. at 206.
79 Id.
80 Comment, Zoning, Communes and Equal Protection, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 319, 324.
81 See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
82 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1973).
83 Id.
84 Id.
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The court of appeals quickly disposed of this contention by declaring that
the protection and maintenance of traditional families "fails to fall within the
proper exercise of the police power.""5 In compelling all members of the com-
munity to conform to the "prevailing ideas of lifestyle," the ordinance enacted
a social preference having "no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare."'
Zoning ordinances, stated the court, may not mask such social preferences."
In dissent, Judge Timbers noted that the majority had again blithely
skirted some difficult questions. In his view, Belle Terre had enacted the ordi-
nance "for the purpose of zoning for a particular neighborhood character in a
community that had always been of that character." ' The ordinance thus
represented and reinforced the sum of many individual choices expressed over
a period of time. Moreover, in light of the fact that the Brookhaven area, of
which Belle Terre was a part, encompassed a wide variety of uses and activities,
Judge Timbers thought the ordinance a "proper use of the general welfare
power to establish one segment of a beneficial larger scheme."8 9
Here, too, precedent supports Judge Timbers' position. Preservation of
the essential character of a neighborhood has traditionally been considered a
legitimate zoning objective: "Zoning regulations which preserve neighborhood
characteristics stabilize the value of property, promote the permanency of
desirable home surroundings and add to the happiness and comfort of citizens."
The Supreme Court of Iowa has declared that "preservation of the character
of the neighborhood is a valid reason for zoning regulations,""' and a wealth
of cases supports this stand. 2 The Boraas majority thus again appears to have
moved rather precipitously in totally disallowing the legitimacy of zoning for
the preservation and maintenance of the traditional family.
2. Other Zoning Objectives
The court of appeals then examined whether the "family" ordinance could
survive "means-evaluation" analysis in view of its relationship to three admit-
tedly legitimate zoning goals: (1) the control of population density, (2) the
85 Id. at 815.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 816.
88 Id. at 822.
89 Id. at 823.
90 8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.24 at 64 (3rd ed. 1965); R.
ANDERSON, supra note 73, § 7.25 at 540:
The courts recognize, as falling within the scope of "general welfare" as that term
is used in statements of the police power, the interest of the community in preserv-
ing the character of single-family residential neighborhoods. . . . Preservation of
the character of neighborhoods is recognized in the more recent decisions as a
proper and even a primary purpose of zoning regulations.
91 Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 254, 111 N.W.2d 758, 763(1961).
92 Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So.2d 368 '(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969);County of Brevard v. Woodham, 223 So.2d 344 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); Kaplan v. City
of Boston, 330 Mass. 381, 113 N.E.2d 856 (1953); Greater Bloomfield Real Estate Co. v.
Bloomfield, 35 Mich. App. 437, 192 N.W.2d 513 (1971); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Mayor and
Council of Carteret, 84 N.J. Super. 525, 202 A.2d 865 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd, 44 N.J. 338,
209 A.2d 105 (1965); Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606(1958); Hendels Investors v. Zoninz Board, 100 R.I. 264, 214 A.2d 200 (1965); DeWitt v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 128 Vt. 313, 262 A.2d 472 (1970).
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prevention of rent inflation, and (3) the alleviation of traffic, noise, and parking
problems.9
With regard to population control, the majority maintained that any
theorization on their part concerning the proper number of unrelated occupants
per dwelling would be "rank speculation.""' The court further pointed out
that the Belle Terre limitation to two unrelated persons per one-family dwelling
was smaller than the size of the average family.95 Finally, the court noted the
existence of alternative means to achieve a control of population density "more
rationally and without discrimination against unrelated groups.""6 These in-
cluded regulation of the number of bedrooms per dwelling structure, restrictions
on the ratio of persons to bedrooms, or most simply, imposition of a "single
housekeeping unit" restriction upon occupancy."'
The remaining two zoning objectives received equally short shrift. Were
the village desirous of preventing rent inflation, the court noted, "the simple
remedy would be adoption of rent controls." ' Furthermore, "a wide variety
of local legislative enactments" would suffice, in the court's opinion, to curb
parking, noise, and traffic problems. The village could, for example, restrict
the number of cars per dwelling unit. Public and private nuisance laws might
also be utilized.99
Judge Timbers again took strong issue with each of these assertions. He
noted that the ordinance was reasonably related to population density because
of the self-limiting tendency of the traditional family. Moreover, the tendency
of unrelated groups to have several unrelated sources of income could easily
force traditional families (generally limited to a single breadwinner) out of an
area through rent inflation. Finally, he considered the presence of more auto-
mobiles, with the attendant traffic and parking problems, to be an undeniable
concomitant of the occupation of one-family dwellings by large groups of un-
related persons.'
Detailed statistical analysis of the population density and inflationary
rental issues lies beyond the scope of this article. These issues, while not un-
important, are definitely secondary for present purposes. More fundamental
problems pervade the Boraas decision.
First, the village has received no opportunity to meet the new standard of
equal protection demanded by the majority. A remand would have had the
merit of allowing Belle Terre an opportunity to demonstrate the rationality of
the ordinance under the more exacting requirements of "sliding-scale" analysis.
More importantly, however, the court of appeals has articulated no clear
standards governing the manner in which a court should carry out a "means-
evaluation" test. The brusque dismissal of the validity of zoning for the tra-
ditional family and the characterization of the village's rationale in support
93 476 F.2d at 816.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 817.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 823-24.
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of the ordinance as "rank speculation" smack of ipse dixit. The ready seizure
upon alternative means at the state's disposal suggests a willingness to act
as a judicial "super-zoner," requiring legislative obeisance to judicial omni-
competence.
Finally, the nature of the justificatory burden borne by the state under
"sliding-scale" analysis remains vague. Is an "in fact" substantial relationship
between the classification and its object dispositive of this burden? Or will the
court go on to consider the merits of that object itself as balanced against the
rights upon which the classification impinges? When and to what extent is the
existence of alternative means at the state's disposal relevant to the burden of
justification it must sustain? The Boraas decision clarifies none of these ques-
tions; instead, the majority promulgates a standard of permissive judicial review
closely akin to the discredited theory of substantive due process.' An analysis
at once so opaque and so productive of untoward consequences suggests a need
for more refined articulation.
V. Possibilities on Appeal
On July 27, 1973, the defendants in Boraas filed an appeal with the United
States Supreme Court." 2  The Court has several alternatives. It could, of
course, avoid detailed resolution of the difficult issues involved in this case by
dismissing the appeal, or by its affirmance without opinion. Two grave flaws,
however, mar such an approach. First, it bestows an imprimatur upon the
appalling confusion that now exists with regard to the situations that properly
call for "sliding-scale" analysis. Concurrently, it would establish no guidelines
to aid the lower federal courts in the actual execution of such "means-evalu-
ation." The Second Circuit alone has displayed uncertainty concerning the
apparently "expanded judicial review" under the equal protection clause fore-
shadowed in recent Supreme Court opinions10u The need for constitutional
clarification by the Supreme Court is pressing.
Second, because such zoning ordinances are widely used and variously
interpreted,0 their validity merits a decision by the Supreme Court. In one
recent study, 99.51% of all residential land in the four northeastern New Jersey
counties of Morris, Somerset, Middlesex, and Monmouth was zoned "single-
family."'0 5 Single-family zoning ordinances have been described as "the most
101 Ruttger, supra note 77, at 206.
102 42 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Aug. 7, 1973) (No. 73-191), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3226 (U.S. Oct 16, 1973).
103 City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1973); Aguayo v.
Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (2d Cir. 1973).
104 R. ANDERSON, supra note 73, § 8.27 at 636:
The term "family" has a common meaning, but its use in zoning regulations has
resulted in numerous attempts to stretch it to include as many as 60 persons. That
the term is not free from ambiguity is suggested by the fact that many zoning ordi-
nances contain a definition of "family," and that the Bureau of Planning of the State
of New York, in a publication designed to aid the draftsmen of zoning ordinances,
provides five separate definitions from which to select.
Note, "Burning the House to Roast the Pig": Unrelated Individuals and Single Family Zon-
ing's Blood Relation Criterion, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 138, 140 (1972).
105 Williams and Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern
New Jersey, 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 475, 486-87 (1971).
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formidable obstacle limiting access of unrelated persons to suburbia.""', If
Boraas signals a nationwide volte-face of the validity of restrictive zoning defini-
tions of "family," the decision should come from the nation's highest court.
If the Supreme Court decides to resolve the important issues involved in
Boraas, they have several possibilities before them. The Court could (1) affirm
and merely reiterate the less than coherent reasoning of the court of appeals;
(2) find "means-evaluation" analysis inapplicable to a Boraas-type situation,
and reverse under an application of the "minimal scrutiny" test; or (3) apply
"sliding-scale" analysis in a clear and articulate manner, either affirming on
the grounds that the ordinance cannot withstand such analysis, or reversing
because the ordinance remains valid even under a "means-evaluation" test.
The third alternative is the soundest as it alone provides an opportunity to
establish definite and uniform standards governing "means-evaluation" analysis.
To that end, a possible formulation of such criteria is offered below. The rele-
vant issues are the (1) applicability and (2) methodology of the "sliding-scale."
VI. Proposed Criteria
A. Applicability
Prior to any considerations of methodology, one must delineate which situa-
tions call for the "means-evaluation" test. Here a comparison of San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez'" with United States Department of
Agriculture u. Moreno..8 will provide a useful distinction.
In Rodriguez the plaintiffs attacked primarily commercial or economic
legislation, specifically, the Texas system of financing public education and its
heavy reliance on local property taxes. Moreover, the invidious discrimination
allegedly imposed by that system had a predominantly economic character:
disparities in per-pupil expenditures among school districts were alleged to violate
equal protection. The spectre of acting as economic "levellers" in matters of
local fiscal policy caused the Court to shy away from any readjustment of the
Texas system:
We are asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political
subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local
interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area
in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has
often admonished against such interferences with the State's fiscal policies
under the Equal Protection Clause.... [W]e stand on familiar ground when
we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the ex-
pertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of
wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public
revenues.
0 9
In Moreno the challenged legislation was again economic in character: the
106 Note, supra note 104, at 161.
107 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
108 413 U.S.-,93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973).
109 411 U.S. at 40-41.
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Food Stamp Act of 1964. ° More specifically, plaintiffs attacked a 1971 amend-
ment 1 to the definition of "household""' 2 contained in the act. That amend-
ment defined household so as to include only groups of related individuals, with
several relatively unimportant exceptions. Unlike Rodriguez, however, the in-
vidious discrimination fostered by the classification had a purely personal and
not economic or commercial character. The Court noted that the legislative
history indicated an intent to prevent "hippies" and "hippie communes" from
participation in the food stamp program. Faced with discrimination of such a
strictly personal and noneconomic nature, the Court did not hesitate to employ
a "means-evaluation" test. While admitting that the government had a legitimate
interest in the prevention of fraud in the program, the opinion noted that the act
itself contained other provisions "aimed specifically at the problems of fraud and
of the voluntary poor.""'  Even assuming the rationality of the legislative classi-
fication between related and unrelated households, the Court did not think that
"the denial of federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible households contain-
ing unrelated members constitutes a rational effort to deal with these con-
Unlike both Rodriguez and Moreno, the classification in Boraas was neither
part of a complex local fiscal policy structure nor detailed commercial and
economic legislation such as the Food Stamp Act. Moreover, the ordinance in
question was "directed squarely against the personal right of individuals to
associate and live together ....,""' The classification thus did not work the
solely economic discrimination involved in Rodriguez.
Under this analysis, three situations emerge:
(1) economic or commercial legislation creating economic discrimina-
tion (Rodriguez);
(2) economic or commercial legislation creating noneconomic or per-
sonal discrimination (Moreno);
(3) noneconomic legislation creating personal discrimination (Boraas).
The danger inherent upon the application of "means-evaluation" in the first
situation should be obvious. Close scrutiny in an attempt to insure precise mathe-
matical economic equality would involve the Court in matters totally inap-
propriate for judicial resolution. The second and third situations, however,
properly invoke some sort of "sliding-scale" test. The Court need involve itself
in no redistribution of wealth, nor need it obtrude its judgment in areas where
lack of judicial expertise prompts deference to the legislative will. Instead, in
110 Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
111 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(e) (Cum. Supp. 1973), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
112 Participation in the food stamp program is on a household rather than an individual
basis.
113 413 U.S.-, 93 S. Ct. at 2826.
114 Id.
115 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 828 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J.,
replying to Timbers, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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thus protecting individual and personal rights, the Court would act in the role
for which a long-standing tradition has abundantly fitted it."
B. Methodology
Assuming the applicability of "means-evaluation" to the situation in Boraas,
it remains but to sketch the contours of such an analysis. This necessitates a two-
step approach.
First, upon a demonstration of personal as opposed to economic discrimina-
tion, the burden of going forward should rest with the state to establish a sub-
stantial factual nexus between the classification and the governmental interest
it allegedly furthers. The "any state of facts reasonably conceived" criterion of
McGowan v. Maryland"' thus becomes entirely inapposite; the state must
demonstrate an actual, not a hypothetical, justification for its infringement upon
personal rights. The availability of alternative means, however, has no relevance
at this point in the analysis. The state need not prove the necessity of its chosen
means, nor must it establish the classification as the best of all possible alter-
natives. An actual, substantial connection will suffice. The standard of substanti-
ality is chosen to provide some definiteness while allowing sufficient leeway for the
development of precedent. Failure to establish the required nexus calls for
the invalidation of the classification.
Given the establishment of this factual connection, the second element of
the "means-evaluation" test comes into play. The burden of going forward shifts
to the party attacking the legislative classification to demonstrate that the rights
upon which the statute infringes outweigh the legitimate interests the state seeks
to further. This, of course, is the true "sliding-scale" balance for as the rights
approach the plateau of "fundamentality" and the extent of their infringement
increases, the proffered state interest must correspondingly rise in importance in
order to uphold the challenged legislation.
Here the existence of alternative means at the state's disposal becomes
pertinent. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison"5 provides a useful criterion.
There the court invalidated as an unjustifiable burden on interstate commerce
a city ordinance which required pasteurization of milk at a plant within five miles
of the city as a prerequisite to sale within the city. The court assumed the
validity of regulation in this area in the interest of the health, safety, and well-
being of local communities, but held that "reasonable and adequate alterna-
tives"" 9 were available.
A similar standard should prevail here. Were a party attacking the classifi-
cation to demonstrate the existence of such "reasonable and adequate alterna-
tives" to further the legitimate interest proposed by the state, that showing should
116 The cases summarized in notes 35-42 supra, when compared with those in note 43
supra, suggest a division along the lines of this classification.
117 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
118 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
119 Id. at 354. The Court adhered to the Dean Milk approach in Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 372 U.S. 84, 94 n.12 (1963), and Polar Ice Cream
and Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 373-75 (1964).
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substantially lessen the importance attached to the state interest in weighing it
against the rights burdened by the classification.
An application of this test to the facts of the Boraas case is beyond the scope
of this article, which seeks only to establish a viable framework for precedential
development in equal protection analysis. 20 Too many important issues require
further inquiry to attempt a definitive judgment at this stage. The village ought
,to be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate the factual connection between
the definition of "family" in the ordinance and the legitimate governmental
objectives it pursues by that ordinance. The pertinence and adequacy of alter-
native means require more refined analysis than that accorded by the court of
appeals. To these issues the Supreme Court should turn its attention.
VII. Conclusion
Grave uncertainty at present shrouds the perimeters of the equal protection
clause. The recent gropings towards a more flexible and equitable standard thus
far attempted by the Supreme Court stand greatly in need of fuller articulation.
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre offers the Court an opportunity to achieve just
that.
An alternative to the rigidities of "two-tier" analysis must be found. At-
tempts to prove the "fundamental" nature of various rights place a heavy strain
on the language of the Constitution, while the lax "minimal scrutiny" standard
fosters judicial myopia in the face of serious discrimination against individual
rights. Some sort of "means-evaluation" or "sliding-scale" test provides a work-
able via media, one in which courts
are asked to do what courts are historically suited to do-apply the law to
factual contexts rather than accept one hypothetical legislative justification
to the exclusion of others that represent the true rationale of the classifica-
tion. This more realistic judicial scrutiny in cases in which the compelling
state interest test is not invoked serves to render the Equal Protection
Clause effective rather [than] to permit all but egregious inequalities to go
unchecked.22 1
A disposition of Boraas along the lines suggested herein would go far to replace
the existing confusion in this area with a stable, clear, and rational standard-
one consonant with the high mandate of equal protection of the laws.
Thaddeus Marciniak
120 The suggested approach, however, does allow the Court to uphold the legitimacy of
zoning for the preservation and maintenance of the traditional family without necessarily
reversing the Boraas decision. Although the State may be able to show a substantial factual
nexus between the ordinance and this state interest, the Court may nonetheless find that in-
terest outweighed by the importance of the rights affected and the extent of their infringement.
121 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815 (2d Cir. 1973).
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